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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
----------------------------------------
RUBY J. WOOD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
G. ELDON ROBERTS, GEORGE A. 
DANSIE, BUILDERS AND ENGINEERS, 
INC., 
Defendants and Appellants. : 
Case No. 15266 
----------------------------------------
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
----------------------------------------
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff and Respondent 
(hereinafter Respondent) against the Defendants and Appellants 
(hereinafter Appellants) and also Harlan Y. Hammond, and Pioneer 
Title Company for the balances purportedly unpaid on the 
purchase price for 45.109 acres of land in West Jordan City, 
Utah, owned by the Respondent and her late husband, Morris T. 
Wood (hereinafter collectively as Woods), for damages based 
upon fraud, for the imposition of a trust upon certain funds 
being received into escrow, for punitive damages of $50,000, 
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attorney's fees, and costs. Appellants filed an Answer Q 
denying liability and alleging defenses of statutes of lirn: 
tion and later pursuant to order of the trial court filed, 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, including in same the basi 
allegations of Appellants' Answer together with Counterclai 
setting forth amounts the Appellants claimed were due and~. 
from Woods (R. 55-61), which Counterclaim the Respondent re 
(R. 62-64). The other two original defendants were dismiss: 
as parties to this Action by Orders of the trial court (R •. 
and R. 54). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the trial court without a~ 
A judgment was entered for Respondent on Respondent's claim' 
subject to Appellants' counterclaim pursuant to a Judgment 
(R. 84-86), which was amended by the Amended Judgment that• 
subsequently entered (R. 140-141). Appellants appealed fro: 
both Judgments (R. 87 and R. 143), which appeals were later 
consolidated by order of this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of theD 
court as to Respondent's claims and the entry of a judgment 
-2-
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in Appellants' favor on their Counterclaim or in the alternative 
that this Action be reversed and remanded for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 1967 Woods and Appellants entered into the first 
of two transactions concerning 45.109 acres of land owned by 
Woods in Section 28, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, S.L.B. & M., 
this land being located about 7100 South and between 2700 and 
3200 West Streets in Salt Lake County, Utah (Ex. 5-P). This 
transaction was evidenced by the Agreement dated May 31, 1967 
(Ex. 1-P) and covered a total of 9.125,acres of land situate 
west of the Salt Lake Canal (Ex. 29-D). This Agreement provided, 
among other things, for the payment to Woods of $3,000.00 per 
acre, or a total of $27,375.00, and for Woods to deliver clear 
title to same to Appellants. The acreage covered by this 
Agreement was subsequently subdivided into 13 lots by Appellants 
(Ex. 5-P) and became West Jordan Estates No. 1 Subdivision 
(hereinafter usually as First Subdivision), 
Before the sale of the first of these 13 lots could 
be closed, Appellants determined that outstanding liens thereon 
exceeded the agreed-upon purchase price of $3,000.00 per acre 
(Tr. 49). This prompted the initiation of the following pro-
cedure to handle disbursement of the proceeds received upon 
-3-
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• 
sale of the lots in First Subdivision: deposit of the sale 
proceeds with an escrow agent (at first Beehive State B k an ar 
later Pioneer Title Company, both of Salt Lake City)·, execut: 
by Woods of appropriate warranty deeds and authorizations of 
closings as sales were made; distribution of the sale procee.: 
first to the parties holding liens (Dean Nelson, mortgagee o' 
Tremonton, Utah and Utah Farm Production Credit Association) 
and then to cover certain costs; and then payment toAppella: 
if in excess of $3 ,000 .00 per acre had been previously disb11 
(Ex. 25-D and Ex. 21-P, Tr. 24-27). This continued until~ 
had received either directly or indirectly in respect to Fir: 
Subdivision $23, 128. 74 (R. 72, 96) with one remaining lot, 
Lot 5, yet unsold. This was subsequently sold t:o Merrill R, 
Bauer and Ethel Bauer with Appellants entering into a letter 
agreement under date of March 27, 1973, providing for its sa: 
price to be $3,270.00 (Pages 13 and 14 of Ex. 17-P). Upoo 
adding the amounts thus received by Woods or where this part 
cular letter agreement covered the situation, the result is: 
Woods were then yet owed concerning First Subdivision the tc: 
sum of $976.26. 
Commencing in 1968 Appellants and Woods began negc: 
iations concerning further land that the latter had in this 
-4-
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area (Ex. 5-P), these lands to be the basis of other subdivisions 
that the Appellants contemplated putting together. Apparently 
at least two and possibly three different forms of agreement 
were proposed either by Appellants or Woods (Ex. 2-P, 3-P and 
4-P), although none of them was ever executed (Tr. 6, 8, 11, 
39, 58). During the last portion of 1968, moreover, Appellants 
commenced some degree of preliminary work directed at further 
development of these proposed other subdivisions, which were 
to be termed West Jordan Estates No. 2, 3, 4, and 5 (Ex. 5-P) 
and included an older farm house and farmstead adjacent thereto 
(hereinafter usually collectively as Second Phase). This 
included some surveying, preliminary preparation of subdivisional 
plats, and proposed dedication of streets (Tr. 40, 47, Ex. 23-P). 
In early 1969 Appellants also entered into escrow with Mr. and 
Mrs. Fredrick M. Poulson regarding two lots in the proposed 
West Jordan Estates No. 2 (Tr. 47, 48, Ex. 32-P) but again 
found that Woods could not deliver clear title to the lands 
involved for the price per acre of $3,000.00 that had obtained 
in respect to First Subdivision. This was due to outstanding 
mortgages in respect to these lands held by Dean Nelson (herein-
after as Nelson), the Utah Farm Production Credit Association, 
-s-
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the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, and Valley Bank and Tru:: 
Company together with delinquent property taxes owed SaltL 
County (Tr. 47). The matter became more critical when Ne] 
through his attorney Peter G. Meloy of Helena, Montana, tk 
to foreclose his mortgage on these and other lands of woo~ 
unless payments onto this obligation were increased (Tr. 41. 
R. 4, 34, 56, 57). 
Appellants then commenced negotiations first witO 
Feder a 1 Land Bank of Berkeley and then with Nelson, throug~ 
Mr. Meloy, to prevent the projected foreclosure and to prot: 
as much as possible the Appellants' position in the situati: 
(Tr. 20, 21). Through financing obtained from Valley BanL 
Trust Company, Appellants obtained the funds ·that would be 
necessary to purchase the Promissory Note and the Federalk 
Bank Mortgage executed by Woods under date of August 18, H 
(hereinafter collectively as Land Bank Mortgage) (Ex. 13-P, 
26-D and 39-D, Tr. 21-23); to provide the initial payment c· 
an Agreement with Nelson (Ex. 12-P and 36-D); and to pay th 
balance then yet unpaid on the mortgages held by Valley Ban 
. c di and Trust Company (Ex. 27-D) and Utah Farm Production re · 
Association (R. 97 as to $1,092.90 so paid); and to pay the 
-6-
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delinquent general property taxes then owed on Second Phase 
(Ex. 28-D). Negotiations regarding the purchase of the lands 
covered by Second Phase (Ex. 5-P) were concluded with Woods 
by the execution and delivery by them to Appellants of a warranty 
Deed dated April 5, 1969 (Ex. 6-P, Tr. 9, 12, 13, 49, 63, 64) 
and the execution and delivery by Nelson, Woods, and Appellants 
of the Agreement dated April 30, 1969 (Ex. 12-P, Tr. 21). Under 
this Agreement Appellants agreed to make certain specified 
payments to Nelson, subordinate the Land Bank Mortgage to the 
lien of Nelson's Mortgage, develop L?ts 1 through 18 of West 
Jordan Estates No. 2 within certain time limits, and personally 
guarantee all payments due under this Agreement. No further 
agreements, aside from this Warranty Deed and this Agreement 
(Ex. 6-P and 12-P) were ever entered into between Woods and 
Appellants regarding the lands projected to be included in 
Second Phase. 
As described above during April and May, 1969, Appellants 
made payments to the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, Nelson, 
Valley Bank and Trust Company, Utah Farm Credit Association, 
and Salt Lake County that enabled Appellants to commence in 
earnest the development of Second Phase. Clear title could then 
-7-
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be obtained on the lots in Second Phase, and Appellants pre, 
with developing the lands therein, among the first being tb 
cone lus ion of sales that had been made of two lots in West. 
Estates No. 2 to Mr. and Mrs. Frederick M. Poulson (Tr. 47
1 
Ex. 32-P and 40-D). In May, 1969, a Trust Agreement was en: 
into between Appellants and Pioneer Title Company (Ex. 37·0 
after Appellants had conveyed most of Second Phase to Pione; 
Title Company, as trustee, this to provide a means of hand!: 
lot sales from Second Phase. Most of the proceeds from lot 
that thereafter occurred were directed towards paying off t: 
obligation that Appellants had incurred under the Agreement 
dated April 30, 1969 (Ex. 12-P); and Nelson was paid the tot 
of the$41,000.00 due thereunder as follows: 
Approximate 
Date of Payment 
May 22, 1969 
October 3, 1969 
September 28, 1970 
February 5, 1971 
Amount Paid 
$ 4,000.00 
2,500.00 
3,243.46 
31,562.30 
(Page 2 of Ex. 18-P, Ex. 19-P, 34-D, 36-D, and 38-D, Tr. 48) 
As payments were made for lands sold, Pioneer Title Company, 
as trustee, first would disburse to Nelson the amounts so 
-8-
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scheduled to be paid to him, recording in each instance a 
release of Nelson's Mortgage as to the particular lands to 
be released in return for this payment (Tr. 14, Page 7 et seq. 
of Ex. 16-P); and Appellants would execute and deliver on 
the same lands a partial release of the Federal Land Bank 
Mortgage (Exemplary of which is Ex. 15-P). In conjunction with 
the last of the above-described payments to Nelson, Woods 
also paid to Nelson the sum of $26,412.76, which retired in 
full the Mortgage held by Nelson on Second Phase and also 
other lands of Woods near Herriman, Utah, and in Idaho (Tr. 68, 
Ex 41-D). Thus, in this manner the mortgage indebtedness on 
Woods' lands that had been so difficult for them to pay off 
was completely retired. 
Thereafter, under date of March 20, 1973, Appellants 
sold to the Woods' daughter and son-in-law, Claudette Palmer and 
Paul Palmer, pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. 
10-P) the old farm home and farmstead (hereinafter usually as 
farm property), that Appellants had acquired under the Warranty 
Deed to them from Woods (Ex. 6-P) but had excluded from the 
lands in Second Phase conveyed to Pioneer Title Company, as 
trustee (Ex. 7-P). 
-9-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT 
DESCRIBED IN THIS POINT ARE CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL. 
A. IT WAS ERROR TO FIND IN FINDING OF FACT NO. 4 THAT 
APPELLANTS BEFORE ANY DOCUMENTS COVERING SECOND PHASE HAD B' 
EXECUTED HAD FILED PLAT PLANS AND SECURED CLEARANCE FROM WE: 
JORDAN CITY. . 
After a majority of the lots comprising First Suo· 
division had been sold by Appellants, they commenced some oi 
the preliminary work towards development of Second Phase 
(Ex. 5-P). This included some of the surveying and plattinr 
of these projected subdivisions and some preliminary steps 
towards clearing with West Jordan City (Tr, 40-47) and was 
apparently done.in late 1968 and early 1969. No evidencewz 
adduced at the trial in this Action which indicated that 
Appellants at this point in time had filed plat plans for an 
of these projected subdivisions and secured clearance from 
West Jordan City in respect thereto. The copy of the Owner' 
Dedication introduced into evidence as Ex. 23-P does not pre 
any further !:as is for this finding, being introduced for a 
limited purpose not extending to its being evidence that sue 
Dedication was the one used in respect to the projected 
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subdivisions nor that it was the one accepted by the proper 
governmental authorities (Tr. 37, 38). 
B. IT WAS ERROR TO FIND IN FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 4 AND 7. 
THAT WOODS DID NOT SEE ANY OF THE MONEY RECEIVED FROM FIRST 
SUBDIVISION, 
While most of the gross proceeds realized from 
sale of the lots from First Subdivision prior to 1971 were 
directed towards retiring the outstanding liens thereon 
(Ex. 25-D), beginning in that year Woods and Appellants each 
received certain sums (Ex. 21-P and 22-P) therefrom. This was 
also borne out by testimony of both Appellants (Tr. 25, 56) and 
also the general effect of the Respondent's testimony in this 
regard (Tr. 63) • 
C, IT WAS ERROR TO FIND IN FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 5 AND 6 THAT 
THE APPELLANTS AGREED TO PAY ALL MORTGAGES OUTSTANDING ON 
SECOND PHASE. 
The extent to which Appellants agreed to retire any 
of the mortgage indebtedness or liens imposed on the lands in 
Second Phase is iimited by that which Appellants did during 
April and May, 1969, or covenanted to do at this time. This 
included the total amount of $41,000.00 scheduled to be paid 
to Nelson under the Agreement of April 30, 1969 (Ex. 12-P) 
and the further sum of $4,259.11 Appellants paid to obtain 
-11-
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releases of miscellaneous mortgages or liens on these l~~ 
(R. 76, 97). Nowhere was evidence adduced at the trial to 
the effect that Appellants agreed to pay off the entirety of 
all mortg':lges outstanding on Second Phase (Tr, 20, 31, 40, :· 
their obligation in this regard being limited, primarily by 
the Agreement of April 30, 1969 (Ex. 12-P). The fact that 
Woods paid off $26,412.76 of the balance of Nelson's Mortga5. 
on or about February 5, 1971 (Ex. 19-P) without further 
agreement from the Appellants in this connection would rein! 
Appellants' position regarding their limited obligation for 
payment of mortgages and liens. 
D. IT WAS ERROR TO FIND IN FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 5 AND 11 
THAT THE SALE PRICE FOR LANDS IN SECOND PHASE WAS $3 ,000.0~ 
PER ACRE. 
Appellants and Woods very definitely agreed that 
$3 ,000 .00 per acre would be the price per acre for the land> 
included in First Subdivision (Tr. 8, 9, Ex. 1-P), but 
this did not cover any lands other than those in this partk 
Subdivision. While various instruments appeared to have bee 
exchanged between Appellants and Woods regarding Second Phai 
(Ex. 2-P, 3-P and 4-P), none of these were ever executed 
(Tr. 6-11, 57). Before these or any instruments similar tD 
-12-
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them could be executed, both Appellants and Woods were made 
aware of the fact that Nelson proposed to foreclose his mort-
gage on all Woods' lands, including those in Second Phase, 
unless something could be done to increase the payments under 
Nelson's Mortgage (Tr. 47, 48. Par. 11 on R. 4, Par. 10 on 
R-34). This precipitated a crisis in dealings between Woods, 
Nelson, and Appellants and prompted the negotiations between 
Nelson, through his attorney, Mr. Meloy, Appellants, and Woods 
during the Spring of 1969 described above in STATEMENT OF THE 
FACTS. It resulted in execution and deiivery of all of the 
instruments between these parties that was to cover Second 
Phase, namely, the Warranty Deed dated April 5, 1969, between 
Woods and Appellants (Ex. 6-P) and the Agreement dated April 30, 
1969, between these parties and Nelson (Ex. 12-P). No other 
or further instruments were ever entered into between Woods 
and Appellants concerning the lands in Second Phase. 
The evidence adduced at the trial was not sufficient 
to establish that a sale price of $3,000.00 applied to the 
lands in Second Phase. The two exhibits dascribed above (Ex. 
6-P and 12-P) do not provide for this. The testimony of both 
Appellants was to the effect that the consideration given for 
-13-
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the lands in Second Phase was the Agreement of April 30 
, 
1969 (Ex. 12-P) and that there was no agreement in this 
regard providing for payment of $3,000.00 per acre (Tr. 9, 
40, 56). All that the Respondent could testify to in this 
regard was that she understood that they were to receive 
$3,000.00 per acre (Tr. 59), although it is abundantly clear 
from her cross-examination that she hsd not participated 
to any degree in business dealings between her late husband 
and Appellants, being present in but two meetings between 
her late husband and Appellants in which Woods ' lands were 
discussed, once in regard to First Subdivision and once witt 
respect to Second Phase (Tr. 65-67). This latter meeting 
was when Woods executed the Warranty Deed of April 5, 1969 
(Ex. 6-P), and her testimony leads to an almost irrefutable 
conclusion that she did not know the elements of the trans· 
action (Tr. 63-64). The fact that Woods executed and deli-
vered Ex. 6-P and 12-P in respect to Second Phase leads, 
moreover, to the conclusion that the parties did not intend 
that the $3,000.00 per acre should apply to the SecondPhasi 
nothing appearing to this effect in eitha- of these instrun:' 
If this acreage figure was to apply to this Phase, what 
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reasonable explanation is there of the execution and delivery 
of these two critical Exhibits. 
E. IT WAS ERROR TO FIND IN FINDING OF FACT NO. 5 THAT THE 
FARM PROPERTY WAS INCLUDED IN THE DEED WITHOUT WOODS' KNOW-
LEDGE OR INTENT • 
The Warranty Deed of April 5, 1969, (Ex. 6-P) very 
definitely included among its calls the farm property (Tr. 12, 
13, Ex. 29-D). The description of the lands covering this 
farm property are there set forth in a metes and bounds 
description, but this is without ambiguity and in a direct and 
forthright manner, Respondent testifieg that she did not know 
that this farm property was included in this Deed (Tr. 58, 64), 
although Appellant G. Eldon Roberts testified that these lands 
were very assuredly subject to the negotiations that went on 
between Appellants and Woods concerning Second Phase (Tr. 13). 
In construing conveyances such as this Deed the 
courts endeavor to effectuate the intent of the parties. In 
doing this, however, where there is no ambiguity in the language 
of the conveyance, this intention must be arrived at from such 
language, giving it its common and accepted meaning. 23 Am. 
Jur. 2d Deeds §159. The intention of the parties is to be 
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derived from the language contained in the conveyance and 
not from other sources. 
• 
"While all clauses and words in a deed will be 
considered in construing it, the courts are not 
concerned with what the parties meant to say but 
the meaning of what they did say. The court' 
cannot surmise as to intention, or even effectuate 
a manifest intention where the granter has omittea 
to use words required to give effect to such 
intention; it must construe the instrument as 
written. The court can neither put words into a 
deed which are not there nor put a construction or. 
words directly contrary to the plain sense of 
them." 23 Am. Jur. 2nd Deeds §161 at 209, 210. 
With the language within this Deed being. unambiguous, the 
court would have to determine the intent of the parties from 
this language, which leads to an irrefutable cone lus ion that 
the farm property was intended to be included despite testi· 
mony elicited from Respondent to contrary. In finding as it 
did in this connection the trial court erred. 
If the language of this Deed was considered ambigu1 
in any sense, the court then could resort to certain general! 
accepted rules of construction in determining the intent 
of the parties • One of the more important of such rules is 
one to the effect that if there is an ambiguity in a conveya: 
permitting alternative constructions, then that construction 
· 11 which is more favorable to the grantee than the grantor wi 
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be adopted, all doubts being resolved against the granter. 
23 Am. Jr. 2d Deeds §165, §299, Meagher v. Uintah Gas co., 
123 Utah 123, 255 P. 2d 989 (1953). The effect of this, if 
applied to this particular Deed, would be that the intent of 
the parties was to cover thereby the farm property. 
F. IT WAS ERROR TO FIND IN FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 5 AND 12 
THAT THE FARM HOME PROPERTY IS CONSIDERED SEPARATE. 
When Appellants obtained the Warranty Deed of April 
5, 1969 (Ex. 6-P), the farm property was included. Subsequently 
in March 1973, this was sold in a separate transaction to the 
daughter and son-in-law of Woods (Ex. iO-P), and it was from 
the sales figure in this latter sale that the $12,000.00 
included in these two Findings is derived. Even assuming, for 
purposes of argument, that there is sufficient evidence to 
warrant a finding of $3,000.00 per acre on all the lands in 
Second Phase, there certainly is insufficient evidence that 
this farm property should have been separated out of the basic 
transaction under which the lands included in Second Phase 
were obtained by Appellants and a substantially higher figure 
attached to it. All the evidence that does apply to any 
price of this farm property is derived from the Uniform Real 
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Estate Contract under which the Appellants so sold it (Ex. 
10-P), and this was entered into nearly four years after t~i 
Appellants first acquired this farm property. 
G. IT WAS ERROR TO FIND IN FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 5, 9, 11, 
AND 12 THE CALCULATIONS REGARDING THE ACREAGES THEREIN SET 
FORTH. 
The acreages included in both First Subdivision 
and in Second Phase were set forth in Ex. 29-D, which was 
stipulated in evidence as the correct acreage amounts in 
each of these areas of land. Assuming again for purposes oi 
argument that $3,000.00 per acre applied to both these tract 
the respective resultant amounts are: 
$3,000.00 x 9.125 = $27,375.00 
$3,000.00 x 35.984 = $107,952.00 
The calculations of Respondent when applied to the totality 
of the lands in each of these two areas, therefore, is in 
error where they depart from these resultant amounts. 
While Finding of Fae t No. 9 purports to cover all 
of First Subdivision that in Part II of Finding of Fact 
No. 12 also covers one of the lots in this particular Sub· 
5 (1 f E 16 P) As such then, division, Lot No. ast page o x. - . 
either the amount set forth in this Part II should be deduct 
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from the amount set forth in Finding of Fact No. 9 or stricken 
in its entirety, this due to it being a duplication. 
H. IT WAS ERROR TO FIND IN FINDING OF FACT NO. 12 AMOUNTS FOR 
WATER STOCK SHOULD BE CHARGED APPELLANTS. 
The water stock described in Part III of Finding 
of Fact No. 12 was part of the security for the Promissory 
Note executed in connection with the Federal Land Bank Mortgage 
(Page 3 of Ex. 39-D). This Land Bank Mortgage is still 
considered outstanding, at least until the termination of this 
Action; and until it is paid in full, Appellants are entitled 
to retain any security in respect to it-. Upon such payment 
in full anything which served as security thereunder which 
cannot be returned to Woods would be the proper subject of 
compensation. Until then, Part III would have to be considered 
premature and made in error. 
I. IT WAS ERROR TO FIND IN FINDING OF FACT NO. 7 THAT A TRUST 
REIATIONSHIP EXISTED BE'l\VEEN WOODS AND APPELLANTS. 
From the facts in respect to this Action the only 
express or direct trust that was in effect appears to have 
been that entered into between Appellants and Pioneer Title 
Company under date of May 29, 1969, regarding Second Phase 
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(Ex. 37-D). Any trust relationship if in effect between 
Woods and Appellants, therefore, must have been one created 
by operation of law, an implied or involuntary trust. Thes: 
implied trusts are generally classified as either resulting 
or constructive. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts §189. While these 
are difficult in many instances to distinguish from each ot: 
a resulting trust arises from the nature or circumstances o: 
consideration involved in a transaction, the holder of lega: 
title holding the property involved for the benefit of thcs: 
who furnished consideration for its acquisition: this typec 
trust is based on equitable consideration. 76 Am. Jur. 2d 
Trusts § 197. Constructive trust arises only after an act oi 
fraud or breach of confidence or duty and is a method of 
relief against same. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts §222. It is 
apparently this kind of trust relationship that is referred 
in Finding of Fact No. 7. 
Analysis of the relationship between Woods and 
Appellants throughout First Subdivision and Second Phase re< 
that this was of the usual vendor-vendee relationship inr~ 
estate transactions. Where conveyances or other instrument 
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were to be executed by Woods, they would in most cases go 
to the escrow agent, either Beehive State Bank or Pioneer 
Title Company, to execute the same (Ex. 25-D, Tr. 24-28). 
As Respondent's attorney characterized it, the degree of trust 
that Appellants and Woods put in each other through their 
many transactions were those in respect to "all business" 
(Tr. 28). This is hardly the confidence required to make 
Appellants trustees for Woods in these circumstances. This 
is particularly true in view of the reluctance of this Court 
in previous pronouncements to extend ~rust relationships to 
the degree included in Finding of Fact No. 7. Renshaw v. 
Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 87 Utah 364, 49 P. 2d 403, 100 A.L.R. 
872 (1935); Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 U. 2d 378, 401 P. 2d 710 
(1965) • 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE INTRODUCTION 
INTO EVIDENCE OF UNEXECUTED INSTRUMENTS IN VIO-
LATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
The agreement that was entered into in respect to 
First Subdivision was the Agreement of May 31, 1967 (Ex. 1-P), 
but this covered only this particular Subdivision and no 
further lands of Woods. During the time when Woods and 
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Appellants were negotiating regarding Second Phase in 196g 
or early 1969 two and possibly three forms of agreement wer 
submitted back and forth between them (Ex, 2-P, 3-P, and4·: 
but none of these were ever executed. That which was event· 
ually entered into by way of agreements in respect to Secon 
Phase was the Warranty Deed of April 5, 1969 (Ex. 6-P) and 
the Agreement of April 30, 1969 (Ex. 12-P). 
All of the three above-described unexecuted instr: 
ments provided for a sale price of $3,000.00 per acre, and 
despite objections of Appellants at the trial (Tr. 10, 37), 
all three were eventually introduced into evidence at the 
trial court. It is apparently upon their basis that the 
trial court made in its Findings of Fact Nos. 5 and 11 find: 
that there was an implied contract that Appellants were to; 
this figure of $3 ,000 .00 per acre for all lands in Second 
Phase. 
Whenever negotiations have been going on regardini 
a proposed transaction and it finally results in the executi 
and delivery of a final instrument or instruments, evidence 
of these negotiations if introduced to contradict, vary, adc 
or subtract from terms of these final instruments is normal! 
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excluded under the well-known parol evidence rule, 30 Am. Jur. 
2d Evidence § 1016; 3 Jones On Evidence 6th Edition §16.1; 
Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 Utah 279, 17 P. 2d 294, 
90 A.L.R. 1299 (1932); Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 Pac. 
888 (1901). The written memorial is said to supersede the 
prior and contemporaneous negotiations, and extrinsic utter-
ances from or in respect to these negotiations are excluded. 
The parol evidence rule applies not only to exclude merely 
oral utterances but also informal writings other than the 
single and final written memorial. 30 ~m. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§1016; Evensen v. Pubco Petroleum Corp., 274 F. 2d 866 (1960); 
Re Gaine's Estate, 15 Cal. 2d 255, 100 P. 2d 1055 (1940); 
Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W. 2d 30 
(1958); Bond et al. v. Wiegardt et al., 36 Wash. 2d 41, 216 P, 2d 
196 (1950). 
The transaction between Woods and Appellants regard-
ing Second Phase had resulted in execution and delivery of the 
above-described Warranty Deed (Ex. 6-P) and Agreement (Ex. 12-P). 
The three unexecuted forms of agreement that had been exchanged 
between Woods and Appellants prior thereto are at variance 
with these two executed instruments but were, nevertheless, 
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admitted into evidence by the trial court. For it to do so 
was clearly in error as being violative of the parol evideD 
rule. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED WHEREVER 
RAISED BY APPELLANTS AND NONE OF CLAIMS OF 
RESPONDENT WERE BARRED BY THIS STATUTE. 
Appellants raised the defense of applicable s~~ 
of limitations at the trial court. This included the three· 
year limitation concerning fraud claims found in Subsection 
78-12-26 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953; the four-year limit: 
concerning contracts, obligations, or liabilities not foundi 
upon an instrument in writing found in Section 78-12-25, Ut 
Code Annotated 1953; and the special one-year extension 
accorded successors of certain decedents found in Section 
78-12-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The Findings of Fact" 
by the trial court appear not to have found that Appellants 
committed fraud, so the first of these statutes of limitatfr 
will not be considered in this Brief. 
The trial court indicated in its Finding of Fact' 
that the continuous dealings between Woods and Appellants 
tolled the statute of limitations. This completely disrega: 
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the distinction between First Subdivision, where development 
was made under an agreed-upon instrument in writing (Ex. 1-P), 
and Second Phase, where development was made under a very 
different set of circumstances with either two instruments 
executed and delivered to Appellants governing (Ex. 6-P and 
12-P) or an implied contract being in effect. It is submitted 
that the trial court erred in blurring the distinction between 
these two developments. 
The trial court made as one of its principal Findings 
of Fact the finding that there arose between Woods and 
Appellants in respect to Second Phase the above-described 
implied contract whereby Appellants were to pay $3,000.00 per 
acre for all lands in this Phase. This being the situation, 
then the four-year statute of limitations is applicable. 
Petty and Riddle, Inc. v. Lunt, 104 Utah 130, 138 P. 2d 648 
(1942). 
The initial inquiry then is as to when an action on this 
basis accrues, for that is when the statute of limitations 
commences to run. In actions based upon implied contracts, 
the statute begins to run on accrual of the action. 51 Am. 
Jur, 2d Limitation of Actions §134; 54 C.J.S. Limitations 
of Actions §158; Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 Pac. 
313 (1927). The action is said to accrue whenever Woods 
-25-
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could have maintained the action to a successful conclusion 
I 
the moment whenever the right of action is complete. 51 Am. 
Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions §107; 54 C.J.S. Limitationsoi 
Actions § 109; Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 41' 
25 P. 2d 952 (1933); State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 
99 Utah 177, 100 P. 2d 575, 131 A.L.R. 816 (1940); O'Hairv. 
Kounalis, 23 U. 2d 355, 463 P. 2d 799 (1970). 
When under this approach then would any causes of 
action accrue to Woods. Since Second Phase is the matter 
at issue, the most logical analysis would have it that this 
particular time coincided with the execution of the two 
instruments under which Appellants took title to the lands 
in this Phase, namely, the Warranty Deed of April 5, 1969 
(Ex. 6-P) and the Agreement of April 30, 1969 (Ex. 12-P), 
these being distinctly at variance with the theory that 
Appellants were to pay $3, 000. 00 per acre for a 11 lands in 
this Phase. That was when Woods could have first maintainei 
an action against Appellants for the $3 ,000 .00 per acre for 
the lands in Second Phase; and that would be when the four· 
year statute of limitations would commence to run. This is 
in excess of five years prior to filing of Respondent's 
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Complaint in November, 1974. 
Under the language of Section 78-12-25, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as in many similar statutes, there is an 
interruption or tolling of this statute of limitations when 
the last charge or payment is made. 54 C.J.S. Limitations 
of Actions §321. The approach apparently taken by the trial 
court was that when Appellants made payment to Nelson and 
others between 1969 and lastly in February, 1971, and thereby 
completely retired the Nelson Mortgage, there occurred a 
further payment upon the implied contract to pay $3,000.00 
per acre. Thus, the statute of limitations was tolled. 
For a payment to toll the applicable statute of 
limitations, however, the payment must be of a certain char-
acter. This is due to the fact that the tolling or interrup-
tion occurs because by thepayment there is an acknowledgment 
or admission of the existence of the indebtedness and from 
which there is implied by law a new promise to pay the balance. 
54 C.J.S. LimitatiOJlSof Actions § 321, 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
of Actions §366. For the part payment to be effectual to 
toll or interrupt the statute of limitations it must be clear, 
direct, voluntary, and absolute, intended to be a payment onto 
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the larger debt, and free of any uncertainty as to the 
identification of the debt on which it is to be applied, 
It must be distinct, unequivocal, and without qualification, 
such as to indicate an intent on the part of the party makir 
payment that it constitutes part payment of the debt in 
question and indicates his willingness to pay the balance, 
54 C.J.S. Limitationsof Actions §322; Upton v. HeiseltConst 
Co., 116 Utah 83, 208 P. 2d 945 (1949); Kelly v. Mcintyre, 
323 Mass 313, 81 N.E. 2d 825 ·(1948); In re Estate of Charie1 
R. Hocking, 3 Wis. 2d 79, 87 N.W. 2d 811 (1958); Estate of 
Ruwe v. Ruwe, 190 Neb. 663, 21 N.W. 2d 610 (1973); Piccolino 
v. Massa, 33 A.D. 2d 643, 305 N.Y.S. 2d 79 (1969). The part 
payment is ineffectual to toll the statute of limitations ii 
at the time of payment the paying party does not recognize 
the debt or has repudiated it. State ex rel. Hudson v. Finr 
et al., 102 Mo. 222, 14 S .W. 984 (1890); Philadelphia v. 
Holmes Electric Co., 335 Pa. 273, 6 A. 2d 884 (1939). 
If the foregoing is applied to the circumstances 
of the payments made by Appellants to Nelson and others bet• 
1969 and February, 1971, it is abundantly clear that these 
1. bl payments were not of the character as to toll the app ica ' 
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statute of limitations. They were not made onto a contract 
that provided for payment to Woods of $3,000.00 per acre on 
Second Phase: they were made after approximately May, 1969, 
at least pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement of April 
30, 1969 (Ex. 12-P), which is at variance with an indebtedness 
of $3,000.00 per acre being owed to Woods. Lacking is the 
unequivocal, distinct, certain type of payment without quali-
fication that indicates Appellants' recognition of their 
obligation to pay the balance on this debt. Thus, these pay-
ments so made by Appellants did not toll,the applicable four-
year statute of limitations. The trial court erred in holding 
that such tolling occurred under the existing circumstances. 
The application of Section 78-12-37, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, to the foregoing four-year statute of limitation, 
moreover, does not afford Respondent any further extension of 
time. Only if the one year provided in this Section is later 
than the times when the four-year statute referred to above 
end will this Section add any time during which an action may 
be filed, Gray Realty Co. vs. Robinson, 111 Utah 521, 184 P. 2d 
237 (1947). Here the one-year period ended July 10, 1972, 
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which is less than that afforded by the above four-year 
statute of limitation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the tru 
court should be reversed as to Respondent's claims and jud 
entered in Appellants' favor on their Counterclaim or in thi 
alternative this Action be reversed and remanded for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~· 
MELVIN E. LESLIE 
Ten Broadway Building 
Ten West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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